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1. Overview  
National dialogues are: “nationally owned political processes aimed at generating consensus 
among a broad range of national stakeholders in times of deep political crisis, in post-war situations 
or during far-reaching political transitions” (Blunck et al., 2017, 21). They are typically accompanied 
by broader societal consultations, involving all sectors of society. Their objective can involve broad-
based change processes (e.g. negotiating a new social contract) or more narrow objectives. 
It has only been in the last couple of years that various guidance and case studies have been 
published on national dialogues. These emerged in acknowledgement that there are many open 
questions and uncertainties regarding the concept of national dialogue; and that there are limited 
resources that provide guidance and practical support for those who are exploring national 
dialogues (Blunck et al., 2017). While there is no blueprint for such dialogues, attention to lessons 
learned can help actors involved to identify factors contributing to the success and failure of 
national dialogues and to key challenges. 
The political context in which a national dialogue takes place can affect the likelihood of success 
or failure. Key factors include:  
 Political will: the greater the level of political will and elite agreement on the way forward, 
the greater the likelihood of successful outcomes and implementation. 
 Links to other transitional processes: national dialogues need to be embedded in larger 
change processes in order to promote real structural change. If disconnected to other 
political processes, such as constitution-making, they are likely to be counter-productive. 
 Common ground among parties: the absence of diametrically opposed political camps 
can make it more likely to arrive at a common view or shared objectives in dialogue, 
allowing for the process to move forward. In contrast, drastically different views can 
exacerbate distrust and stall the process. 
 Public buy-in: public support or lack thereof can enable or constrain progress in the 
national dialogue process. The degree of buy-in is influenced by the availability of public 
information, good communication, and media engagement – all of which affect the level of 
transparency and understanding of the process.     
 Learning from past experience: national dialogues have benefitted from dialogue 
expertise and learning from past national dialogues. 
 The role of external actors and national ownership: support (e.g. political, financial and 
technical support) or resistance of external actors can influence the degree of success of 
national dialogues. It is important to strike a balance between external support and national 
ownership. The latter can increase the likelihood of public buy-in, perceptions of legitimacy 
– and chances of implementation. 
Alongside political context factors, design or process factors can influence the likelihood of 
reaching sustainable agreements. Key process factors include:  
 The degree of inclusion and participation: the vast majority of literature emphasises that 
the transformative potential of national dialogues can only be realised if they are genuinely 
inclusive of society. In order to be truly inclusive, it is necessary to help balance power 
asymmetries and ensure actual decision-making power. Highly inclusive and participatory 
national dialogues may render discussions unwieldly, however, and make it difficult to 
resolve key political questions. The success of national dialogues can depend in large part 
on finding the right equilibrium between efficiency and inclusiveness.   
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 Representation and selection criteria: established selection criteria and procedures for 
participants in national dialogues can support or hinder the broad representation of 
different social and political groups. Transparency in the criteria is significantly important.  
 Objective and scope-setting: it is important to avoid overburdening mandates and 
agendas. It can be challenging to strike a balance between the breadth of the mandate, 
efficiency and independence. While a narrower mandate can be more manageable and 
efficient, it can limit the room for change and may contribute to the persistence of an elite-
led process. Clarity and relevance to local populations are key characteristics to adopt in 
deriving a suitable mandate and agenda. Addressing development issues and peace 
dividends at the outset can be important to the success of national dialogues.  
 Institutional framework and support structures: a comprehensive support structure of 
important actors close to competing parties can help participants to be prepared (with the 
necessary expertise and tools), to compromise and to build coalitions, allowing them time 
to agree on common positions. Such structures do not, however, necessarily improve the 
quality of participation or guarantee implementation.  
 Role of authority figures: a credible, broadly accepted, independent, respected and 
charismatic convenor, mediator or facilitator can significantly affect the strength of the 
national dialogue, indicating seriousness and trust in the process.  
 Decision-making procedures: these can enable or constrain the ability of national 
dialogues to reach an agreement and implement it.  While consensus can help to expand 
agendas and to include often excluded voices, an inability to reach consensus can benefit 
the more established forces, as the absence of movement can mean preserving the status 
quo. Consensus-based decision-making needs to be complemented by other pragmatic 
mechanisms where deadlocks can be broken, such as the use of working groups. 
 Confidence-building measures: national dialogues must be accompanied by a series of 
steps to attenuate tensions, in order to establish a level of “working trust” to engage in a 
meaningful dialogue. Trust-building is important throughout all phases in order to ensure 
that agreements are also implemented.  
 Provision for implementation: it is necessary to ensure that sufficient funds for 
implementation, expertise and accountability mechanisms are in place, such that key 
actors may feel bound by what has been agreed. Transitional bodies and/or new 
institutions are often set up to implement the outcomes. Implementation can be tough if 
participants have made unrealistic decisions, if political will is absent, or if external actors 
fail to provide necessary support. 
2. National dialogues: the concept 
National dialogues are: “nationally owned political processes aimed at generating consensus 
among a broad range of national stakeholders in times of deep political crisis, in post-war situations 
or during far-reaching political transitions” (Blunck, et al., 2017, 21). They are typically convened 
when the fundamental nature or survival of a government is in question and are meant to resolve 
political crises, improve the legitimacy of institutions, and lead countries into political transitions 
(Paffenholz et al., 2017; Harlander, 2016).  
National dialogues are a popular tool for structural reforms, as they provide access for parties and 
groups often excluded from or under-represented in political negotiations (Harlander, 2016). They 
are usually accompanied by broader, inclusive societal consultations aimed at channelling 
people’s concerns and demands into the process; and enhancing legitimacy and ownership over 
the process and its outcomes (CEG, 2017; Paffenholz et al., 2017; Papagianni, 2014).They are 
often attempted after exclusive elite-based negotiation formats have failed or are considered 
inadequate to prevent further instability (Harlander, 2016).  
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National dialogues can either replace or complement more exclusive talks (Harlander, 2016). They 
can also entail a combination of formal processes, informal discussions and ad hoc negotiations 
(Kaplan and Freeman, 2015).  Civil society leaders, and even external actors, can initiate informal 
dialogues between key actors, even if they have lesser mandates than one initiated by the state. 
These informal dialogues can entail trust-building meetings, negotiations and consultations that 
lay the groundwork for formal national dialogue (Kaplan and Freeman, 2015). 
National dialogues have clear structures (often a mix of plenary sessions and working groups) and 
defined rules and procedures for dialogue and decision-making. Their size and composition can 
vary considerably and they can last from several days to several years. Their objective can 
involve broad-based change processes (e.g. negotiating a new social contract, redefining state-
society relations, establishing new political institutions; and/or determining the process through 
which reforms will take place etc.) (Blunck et al., 2017; Kaplan and Freeman, 2017; Paffenholz et 
al., 2017; Harlander, 2016). In Yemen, for example, dialogue led participants to agree on the need 
for the state to adopt a federal political system. Such cases of fundamental change usually involve 
large segments of society to generate widespread input and support (Blunck et al., 2017; 
Harlander, 2016). National dialogues with shorter-term endeavours and/or a more narrow set of 
objectives (e.g. establishing security arrangements, constitutional amendments, truth 
commissions etc.; and/or geared specifically for resolving or preventing the outbreak of violence) 
are usually more limited in their mandates, smaller in size and shorter in duration. They also 
typically entail less inclusive structures, such as in Tunisia in 2013, which gathered only political 
parties with the goal of addressing outbreaks of violence (Blunck et al., 2017; Harlander, 2016). 
National dialogues pass through three successive phases: preparation, process and 
implementation (Blunck et al., 2017). The preparation phase can be as long, or longer, than the 
official process, as it often entails a mini-negotiation processes in itself to establish key parameters 
and the institutional framework (i.e. mandate, agenda, participant selection, decision-making 
procedures, etc.). Some countries task a key institutional body with preparing the process. Once 
the key parameters are established, preferably by consensus, the process (or negotiation) phase 
- the most public phase of the national dialogue - begins. Once an outcome is reached, the 
implementation phase begins (Blunck et al., 2017). The success of national dialogues can be 
defined on two levels, first in terms of whether an agreement was reached or not; and second, the 
extent to which the agreement was actually implemented (Paffenholz et al., 2017). 
A national dialogue’s context and objectives have a significant impact on its development and 
outcome. There is no guarantee that any national dialogue will succeed; and many have failed 
(Harlander, 2016). Whether  a  national  dialogue  has  actually  succeeded  is  often  a  contentious  
question. The outcomes of national dialogues are sometimes intangible and difficult to measure. 
They may include: the strengthening of a culture of debate and free speech; the breaking of taboo 
issues; the entrenchment of certain norms of inclusion and representation of marginalised groups; 
and the ability to keep all the political actors inside the political process (Papagianni, 2014). In 
addition, dialogues may at first be considered successful, but then be followed by disastrous 
instability or even war. In 2013–2014, the Yemeni National Dialogue Conference (NDC) was 
praised for its inclusiveness and technical quality, but its recommendations were not implemented 
and the country went on to face a violent conflict and deep humanitarian crisis (Harlander, 2016). 
Participants’ willingness and the technical quality of the process thus do not guarantee a positive 
outcome (Harlander, 2016). 
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3. Lessons learned: political context factors 
The political context in which a national dialogue takes place can affect the likelihood of success 
or failure. Key factors include: political will; links to other transitional processes; common ground 
among parties; public buy-in; learning from past experience; and the role of external actors and 
national ownership. 
Political will 
Based on a comparative analysis of 17 cases of national dialogues held between 1990 and 2014, 
Paffenholz et al. (2017) find that the support or resistance of elites1 to national dialogue is a crucial 
factor determining the chances of reaching and implementing agreements (Paffenholz et al., 2017). 
The motivations for engaging in dialogue are important. In some cases, political actors may 
engage solely for instrumental or tactical reasons (e.g. to consolidate the power of the regime, to 
buy time while still aiming to achieve a military victory, or to gain amnesty for past crimes), without 
commitment to a peaceful outcome (Barnes, 2017; El-Battahani, 2014). In such situations, for 
example in Sudan, negotiations can be conducted in bad faith; with declared objectives of a 
national dialogue not necessarily reflecting the actual objectives of the parties (Harlander, 2016; 
El-Battahani, 2014).  
In some cases, dialogue may be imposed upon parties by external actors, without adequate 
internal commitment to reach an agreement (see also the section on External actors and 
ownership), also as in the case of Sudan (El-Battahani, 2014). Where an elite agreement on the 
way forward is absent, it is difficult for the dialogue processes to independently alter existing power 
balances and promote peaceful transitions (Papagianni, 2014). In contrast, where political will is 
present, along with elite agreement on the way forward and clear dialogue outcomes, the chances 
of implementation are higher (El-Battahani, 2014; Papagianni, 2014). 
Links to other transition processes 
National dialogues must be embedded in larger change processes in order to stimulate real 
structural change (Blunck et al., 2017; Murray, 2017). A national dialogue’s mandate should outline 
what powers it has and how it relates to the rest of the political process and to existing 
institutions (Pagagianni, 2014). If a national dialogue is designed to play a role in the writing of a 
new constitution or to reform problems with an existing document, for example, it needs to be 
linked to a process and set of institutions that achieves one of these objectives (Blunck et al., 
2017). In Colombia, the peace process was integrated with a constituent assembly that produced 
the country’s 1991 constitution. In South Africa, political dialogues determined the constitutional 
framework and the process for the establishment of a constitution-making body and holding of 
elections (Kaplan and Freeman, 2015). In Yemen, the NDC process to develop a new social 
contract was connected to the existing political system; the government was to be bound by the 
NDC’s outcomes and the new constitution if they were put into effect through a national referendum 
(Blunck et al., 2017). 
                                                   
1 Defined as groups which hold a disproportionate amount of political, social and economic power compared to 
the rest of society (Paffenholz et al., 2017). 
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In contrast, national dialogues that are disconnected from other political processes, such as those 
that run parallel to constitution-making processes, are likely to be counter-productive.  In Libya, for 
example, the National Dialogue Preparatory Conference (NDPC) had no clear relationship to other 
key institutions in the transitional process (Van Lier, 2017).  In particular, while past national 
dialogues in Libya have also concerned constitution making, there have been no mechanisms to 
coordinate with the Constitutional Drafting Authority, and to ensure that the processes were 
mutually reinforcing, without competing visions of the constitutional future (Murray, 2017; Van Lier, 
2017). Coordination with other transitional processes within a comprehensive transitional 
framework could have been mutually beneficial, avoiding duplication of efforts and potentially 
adverse outcomes (Van Lier, 2017).  
Common ground 
Successful national dialogue processes have involved negotiating parties that had a strong support 
base and credible claim of legitimacy in representing their constituency, alongside the political will 
to implement what was agreed (El-Battahani, 2014).  In addition, the absence of polarisation 
between competing, diametrically opposed political and ideological camps is also a success 
factor (El-Battahani, 2014). The different agendas of the key conflict actors in Sudan during 2005-
2011 (El-Battahani, 2014), for example, and between conflicting factions in Yemen (alongside an 
externally driven agenda) undermined the development of a common view or shared objectives in 
dialogue. This, in turn, exacerbated distrust among conflicting actors (Elayah et al., 2018).  In 
Venezuela, while there has been some consensus on economic issues, the Chavistas and the 
opposition group held diametrically opposed positions on the state of Venezuelan democracy, 
which undermined the ability to compromise or explore areas of convergence (Ellner, 2017). In 
Mali, there are differing views on development priorities between government and civil society, 
making it difficult to settle on what issues should be discussed in the national dialogue (Hartmann, 
2017).  
Public buy-in 
Public support or lack thereof is another key element that either enables or constrains progress in 
the national dialogue process (Paffenholz et al., 2017). Public information, good 
communication, and media engagement are thus key elements, as they influence the degree 
of public support and perceptions of legitimacy. Public relations campaigns have contributed to 
generating more widespread popular support for the implementation of an agreement reached 
during a national dialogue (Paffenholz et al., 2017).  
In Benin, for example, radio broadcasts of the national dialogue, published images of the sessions 
in print media, and the availability of videotapes of the debates, bolstered public support. This 
coverage enhanced transparency, allowed local populations, including rural populations, to remain 
informed about key developments in the process, and increased the perceived legitimacy of the 
dialogue (Paffenholz et al., 2017). Providing adequate information about national dialogues to all 
relevant segments of society is essential to ensure equal chances for broad-based representation 
(Blunck et al, 2017). In Poland, effective media and public consultation activities significantly 
supported the national dialogue process and contributed to a diversification of the political 
landscape and eventually a change in power relations (Blunck et al., 2017). 
In contrast, if the public is unaware of the national dialogue, it will neither be able to provide input 
nor feel inclined to promote its results (Blunck et al., 2017).  In Iraq, for example, the national 
dialogue proceeded without any sound public information campaign or public debate and with 
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minimal media attention. In addition, the agenda was set in a very short time, only days prior to the 
event. This lack of information sharing effectively hindered any meaningful participation by 
opposition groups and civil society, resulting in a narrow, politically one-sided process involving 
immediate political elite.  All of this reinforced the alienating nature of the event (Blunck et al, 2017). 
In Sudan, high levels of media censorship means that the public has had very little understanding 
of the national dialogue and negotiation of peace agreements (El-Battahani, 2014).  In Guatemala, 
there has been little dissemination of information on advances made in the negotiation of 
agreements, in the necessary languages. Improved, widespread dissemination could contribute to 
greater buy-in and ownership among the population (CEG, 2017). 
Popular consultations can help with disseminating information and receiving input to feed 
back into the process. They are particularly important when a national dialogue seeks 
fundamental change (Blunck et al., 2017). Such consultations can take place throughout the whole 
process (e.g. South Africa), or prior to (e.g. Colombia), during and after (e.g. Mali) national 
dialogues (Blunck et al., 2017). 
Where public buy-in exists, support for the process can nonetheless decline over time if 
people become frustrated with delays, diminishing legitimacy, or a lack of progress (Paffenholz et 
al., 2017). Good communication and information sharing tends to be a key factor for maintaining 
support and should thus remain an important factor throughout - before, during and after the 
dialogue and negotiation (CEG, 2017; Paffenholz et al., 2017). In Yemen, for example, a one year 
delay of the national dialogue process may not have necessarily resulted in a loss of public support 
had the responsible national actors adequately communicated their progress and deficiencies to 
the general population (Paffenholz et al., 2017). 
Despite the presence of an information sharing strategy, it can be challenging to reach out to 
ordinary citizens. In Yemen, for example, the NDC had a developed communication and media 
strategy and a designated body in charge of the strategy and all interaction with the media. This 
contributed to ensuring media coverage for certain events and developments within the NDC. 
There was, however, inadequate awareness-raising to get citizens to understand the NDC process 
and its significance, resulting in little effect on the average citizen, who remained distant from the 
process (Blunck et al., 2017). Subsequent efforts were made to communicate the processes and 
outcomes of the NDC to the public and to incorporate broader public consultation on key issues, 
through an updated NDC website, television and radio programming, scheduled outreach, 
dialogues and other public activities. Nonetheless, most people on the street still had little 
knowledge, understanding or ownership of the dialogue (Gaston, 2014). While the outreach 
component has been a way to try to increase the legitimacy of the NDC process, Hassan and 
Eshaq (2014) find that outreach consultations were carried in a shallow way, where the input and 
feedback gathered was not properly streamed into the deliberations of the NDC. 
Past experience 
National dialogues have benefitted from existing dialogue expertise in a country, such as 
experiences with local-level mediation.  Experienced local facilitators have, for example, worked 
inside or outside of national dialogues to bring parties together to a position of consensus 
(Paffenholz et al., 2017). 
Prior experience with national dialogue negotiations has also helped in terms of learning from the 
country’s own or from other country’s successful and unsuccessful experiences and avoiding the 
repetition of prior mistakes (Paffenholz et al., 2017; Kaplan and Freeman, 2015). In South Sudan, 
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for example, seminars were organised in which experts offered expertise on how to conduct 
consultations and shared lessons learned from other national dialogues (Deng, 2017). 
External actors and ownership 
Although national dialogues are widely recognised as a nationally owned process, support or 
resistance of external actors can also influence the degree of success of national dialogues 
(Odigie, 2017; Paffenholz et al., 2017). Relevant external actors can include neighbouring 
countries, international support groups, or regional and international organisations. Since 
regional actors may be more vested in national dialogue outcomes and may have pre-existing 
relationships with the key parties to the conflict, they may play a greater role in national dialogue 
outcomes (Paffenholz et al., 2017).  
In Yemen, for example, regional conflicts have a significant effect on internal affairs. As such, 
regional involvement (i.e. the direct presence of regional powers Iran and Saudi Arabia) in the 
national dialogue process may be necessary to resolve many of the disputes (Elayah et al., 2018). 
The support, interest and at times political pressure from the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) 
influenced considerably the preparation and holding of the national dialogue, although the whole 
process unravelled a few months later (Harlander, 2016).  
External actors can also be classified by function, including actors: seeking to influence the 
outcome of the process; building support for the process and encouraging parties to engage; 
providing technical expertise; observing the process, which may help to build confidence among 
parties; providing facilitation and expertise to overcome deadlocks; providing funding for various 
aspects of the national dialogue process; assisting in monitoring and implementing the outcomes 
of the dialogue process (Blunck et al., 2017; Harlander, 2016). In particular, external actors can 
play a more effective role in national dialogue processes if they (Kestement, 2018):  
 Develop a strong relationship with the country involved in a national dialogue, and 
considerable influence in the region, which can help to pressure conflict parties into 
participating in national dialogues in a fair and sustainable way. 
 Deepen connections with civil society organisations and opposition parties, which can 
strengthen their facilitating role and bring various actors to the table.  
 Provide financial support to help the national authorities ensure the provision of basic 
services to the population. Without attention to such services, national dialogue processes 
can lose legitimacy.  
 Provide technical support and expertise in order to reduce power asymmetries and ensure 
participants with inadequate training and know-how can act on equal footing with other 
parties. 
Ownership 
Contrary to many other conflict transformation mechanisms, national dialogues should be 
nationally facilitated processes, as this increases the likelihood of public buy-in, 
perceptions of legitimacy; and the likelihood of achieving implementation and transformation 
(Barnes, 2017; Blunck et al., 2017; Harlander, 2016). Internal mediators (e.g. individuals, civic 
institutions, religious institutions, or a group of societal institutions, as in Tunisia etc.) have often 
played a key role in national dialogue settings, convening and facilitating the process and holding 
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it together during its various phases (Blunck et al., 2017). It is thus important to strike a balance 
between external support and national ownership (POMEPS, 2013). 
It can be challenging to navigate the involvement of various external actors as they may have 
opposing objectives or views in supporting the national dialogue (Harlander, 2016). External 
actors can, for example, encourage broad-based representation and the participation of 
marginalised segments of society, but they can also produce tension if their vision of inclusion 
differs from locally held ideas (Blunck et al., 2017).  
In Yemen, there were concerns among the local population that the NDC was more of an externally 
driven process rather than a Yemeni national process (Kestement, 2017); and that external actors 
differed from local actors and each other in their interests and objectives. The US, for example, 
was considered largely interested in countering al Qaeda, whereas Saudi Arabia was focused on 
the distribution of power in Yemen. These were in opposition to internal Yemeni aspirations for 
change (POMEPS, 2013). At the same time, however, there was acknowledgement among the 
local population that only external pressure would move the process along in the face of weak local 
leadership (POMEPS, 2013). 
In Libya, the UN intervened directly in the national dialogue after the vote of no-confidence in the 
prime minister in 2014, acting as a mediator itself rather than pursuing dialogue through a Libyan 
mediating broker. Moreover, the goals and mandate espoused by the UN, focused on forming a 
unity government and reaching certain agreements between rival factions, were considered by 
some to be contrary to the broader vision of internal actors (Van Lier, 2107). Alongside, the UN 
also advocated for a different selection process focused on key actors within the standoff, rather 
than a more inclusive selection process (Van Lier, 2017).   
4. Lessons learned: process factors 
Alongside political context factors, the design of a national dialogue shapes the level of 
representativeness and the distribution of power within the process. As such, design or process 
factors can influence the likelihood of reaching sustainable agreements (Paffenholz et al., 2017). 
Key process factors include: the degree of inclusion and participation; representation and selection 
criteria; objective and scope-setting; institutional framework and support structures; role of 
authority figures; decision-making procedures; confidence-building measures; and provision for 
implementation. 
Inclusion and participation 
The vast majority of literature on national dialogues emphasises that the transformative potential 
of such dialogues can only be realised if they are genuinely inclusive of society as whole (Barnes, 
2017; Blunck et al., 2017). Inclusivity relates to ‘process inclusivity’ (the level of societal and 
political representation) in the preparatory and actual dialogue phases; and to ‘outcome inclusivity’ 
(the level of inclusiveness created by the national dialogue’s outputs) in the post-national 
dialogue/implementation phase (Planta et al., 2015). The degree of inclusiveness, and extent to 
which different political actors and segments of society are included, shapes significantly 
whether stakeholders view the national dialogue as a valid way in which to address their 
grievances and aspirations (Blunck et al., 2017; CEG, 2017). 
There is a growing interest in and recognition of the importance of including women, young 
people and minorities in transition processes, which has resulted in more representatives of such 
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groups appointed to delegations and the incorporation of their views and needs into the agenda 
(Blunck et al., 2017; Kaplan and Freeman, 2015). Strong ties to key political and religious groups, 
civil society actors and state institutions outside the formal process must also be maintained 
(Kaplan and Freeman, 2015). In Yemen, women and youth were effectively included in the national 
dialogue process through a quota system; whereas Jordan did not establish a mechanism for 
including women or young people adequately, which discredited the overall process (Blunck et al., 
2017). 
Young people and women may, however, feel firmly bound by party lines during internal party 
meetings. As such, it may be beneficial to include representatives of civil society organisations that 
work specifically on youth and women’s issues (Blunck et al., 2017). It would also be helpful to 
include other local influential actors that either instigated and/or support the change 
process but are not bound by party lines, such well-known activists or members of social 
movements (Blunck et al., 2017). As they are not recognised as official parties, they have often 
been left out entirely out of the process, undermining the legitimacy of the process (Blunck et al., 
2017).  
Even if the difficult task of including a broad range of different constituencies is accomplished, 
those who finally participate at the national dialogue may not necessarily be representative of the 
group they have been selected for, as there are vast differences among groups, labelled as 
“women” or “youth”. This can, in turn, result in the exclusion of marginalised members of social 
groups (Planta et al., 2015). In order to counter this difficulty, some dialogue processes have tried 
to adopt participative methodologies of self-selection with clear-cut rules of eligibility for group 
members to ensure vertical inclusivity, as in the case of Yemen. Another strategy to overcome 
inclusivity gaps entails educating and training marginalised communities in issues related to 
national dialogue processes prior to the events themselves. This can contribute to their 
empowerment and improve their chances for informed participation, also as in the case of Yemen 
(Papagianni, 2014). 
Inclusivity is important in all of the phases: preparatory, process/negotiation, and 
implementation (Barnes, 2017; Blunck et al., 2017). If an inclusive approach is not followed in the 
preparatory phase and in the composition of the preparatory body, the legitimacy of the process 
and a sense of ownership could be undermined from the outset (Blunck et al., 2017). The 
composition of delegates, their form of participation and the design of the decision-making process, 
decided in preparatory phases, are all essential to the level of inclusivity during the national 
dialogue itself (Planta et al., 2015). The degree of inclusiveness affects whether stakeholders 
accept the mandate and agenda or other decisions made (Blunck et al., 2017; CEG, 2017).  
Mandate-setting: the process of arriving at a mandate can, in practice, be quite exclusive, in some 
cases only drafted by one group (Blunck et al., 2017). In some cases, the mandate is developed 
among the main political actors or leaders representing parties to a conflict, frequently with third-
party mediation by insiders (e.g. the Quartet in Tunisia) or externals (the UN in Yemen) (Blunck et 
al., 2017). In other cases, it is negotiated by relatively inclusive committees tasked to prepare 
dialogues to build national consensus on key issues (e.g. in West Africa) (Papagianni, 2014).  It is 
also possible and has been the case that the mandate is first negotiated by a narrow set of elites, 
but the dialogue itself is opened up to a wider set of actors, in particular minorities and 
representatives of civil society (e.g. in Yemen, where the mandate was established by the main 
political actors, but the national dialogue itself included representatives of youth, women’s and 
other civil society organisations (Harlander, 2016; Papagianni, 2014).  This raises questions, 
however, about the actual weight of parties that attend a national dialogue but were not included 
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in negotiations on the mandate and rules of procedure; and the view that inclusiveness is only a 
façade (Harlander, 2016). There is also the risk that the mandate may be disputed by those that 
had not initially been included in the negotiation process, and/or that the national dialogue itself 
may then be boycotted by important stakeholders or influential social and political groups from the 
very outset (Planta et al., 2015). 
It is thus, advisable that a national dialogue mandate should emerge from a consensus among the 
main stakeholders who could potentially obstruct the process, while making sure that all 
participants, even those on the fringes, agree to the mandate (Blunck et al., 2017). While an 
inclusive preparatory committee does not guarantee an inclusive national dialogue, the chances 
of inclusivity at a later stage are greater if the committee moves beyond traditional power structures 
(Planta et al., 2015). 
Agenda-setting: The process of agenda setting, if conducted inclusively and transparently, can 
provide further clarity on the nature of the national dialogue, generate a shared vision, commit 
parties to the process and serve as an exercise in trust-building (Blunck et al., 2017). It is possible 
for national dialogue agendas to develop from highly participatory processes of consultation within 
stakeholder groups and in the wider society. In Kenya, for example, one of the mediators 
encouraged women leaders and organisations to produce a common agenda of concerns to be 
addressed by the preparatory body for discussion at the national dialogue (Blunck et al., 2017). 
Similar to setting the mandate, the process of agreeing an agenda is also a ‘mini’ negotiation in 
itself, whereby the exclusion of certain actors may undermine their buy-in and the perceived 
legitimacy of the national dialogue (Blunck et al., 2017). 
Size: Based on an analysis of 17 national dialogues, the number of participants in the national 
dialogue does not seem to diminish or increase the likelihood of reaching or implementing an 
agreement (Paffenholz et al., 2017). The number of participants has differed significantly between 
national dialogues (Harlander, 2016). There is no standard or ideal size: they can be small (e.g. 
12–55 participants in the Eastern and Central European roundtables), medium sized, e.g. 565 
participants in Yemen) or large, (e.g. 1,600 or more participants in Afghanistan’s Emergency Loya 
Jirga) (Blunck et al., 2017, 81). The appropriate size depends on the specific characteristics of the 
country in which the national dialogue takes place and on the objective(s) of the dialogue. If the 
aim is limited to a single issue, only a few participants directly connected to the issue may be 
needed. Whereas, if the aim is to establish a new social contract, a larger number of participants 
representing a broader section of the society is necessary (Blunck et al., 2017). 
Key challenges to inclusion 
Balance of power issues:  Efforts to include different segments of society will not necessarily 
create an environment conducive to successful dialogue, as persistent imbalances of power in the 
community often persist, with certain actors having overarching control over everything in society 
(Elayah et al., 2018). As such, the transformative potential of national dialogue processes may 
only be realised if they help to balance power asymmetries, enabling collective engagement and 
the generation of mutually agreed outcomes (Barnes, 2017). 
Fair representation: It is important to distinguish between diversity (the presence of a variety of 
parties) and actual inclusiveness, whereby parties are allocated actual weight in decision-making 
(Harlander, 2016). The inclusion of women, young people and marginalised communities in the 
national dialogue process, for example, needs to extend beyond mere presence to enabling them 
to voice their concerns, engage in decision making, and influence the process. The absence of 
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such meaningful participation can lead to frustration and dissatisfaction; and may increase the 
possibility these actors becoming spoilers of the process instead (Blunck et al., 2017). 
Decision-making power could be wielded through proportional representation (Harlander, 2016). 
In Bahrain, each opposition group invited to participate was allocated five seats, regardless of their 
size and influence in society. This resulted in the largest political party (Al Wefaq) pulling out of the 
national dialogue in 2011 as it considered that its 5 delegates out of 300 did not amount to sufficient 
weight in the process (Harlander, 2016). Similarly, in Jordan, there was no proportional 
representation of different political groups in the national dialogue, which meant the Islamic Action 
Front, the largest political opposition party was asked to send the same number of delegates as 
other smaller parties. There was also no quota system in place to ensure fair representation of 
women, young people, or minorities, resulting in their under-representation, or complete exclusion 
in the case of youth (Blunck et al., 2017). Further, the selection procedures was entirely led by the 
government. While those selected were of diverse backgrounds, there was no transparency in the 
selections and they were not considered as representative of the people (Blunck et al, 2017). As 
such, the national dialogue failed to generate broad-based  legitimacy  and  continued  to  be  
perceived  as  a  largely  elite-driven process (Blunck et al., 2017). 
Boycotting: Despite efforts to promote inclusion, if an important group decides to boycott the 
process, the process will lose its legitimacy (Harlander, 2016). As noted, in Bahrain, opposition 
party Al Wefaq walked out of the process, after being granted only five seats, which was the same 
number allocated smaller, less influential parties (Harlander, 2016). In Guatemala, the 1989 Grand 
National Dialogue was suspended due to increased safety concerns for its participants and the 
boycott of some key parties involved in the civil war (Harlander, 2016). In addition, the business 
sector, a key actor in negotiations, did not get involved in the national dialogue process. This 
undermined the process as the economic aspect is vital for the implementation of transformative 
changes (CEG, 2017).  
Country cases 
Yemen: The National Dialogue Conference 2013 in Yemen was successful in achieving 
inclusiveness in its dialogue process. It enabled a diverse group of political and social actors in 
Yemeni society (including smaller political parties, youth, women and other groups traditionally 
been excluded from political decision-making) to sit at the same table on an equal footing and to 
be involved in decision-making processes (Elayah et al., 2018; Hartmann, 2017; Gaston, 2014; 
Hassan and Eshaq, 2014). The conference allocated 20 per cent of seats to youth delegates and 
30 per cent to women (Hartmann, 2017; Papagianni, 2014). They were able to engage in strong 
advocacy for civic freedoms, rarely considered by the political class alone, which, in turn, had the 
potential to shift the agenda and broaden the parameters of discussion. Many of the 
recommendations from the NDC included wider considerations of development, civil rights, female 
participation in government and security sectors (Hartmann, 2017; Gaston, 2014; Hassan and 
Eshaq, 2014). 
Alongside these successes with inclusion, the NDC suffered from various setbacks and 
challenges. First, despite significant efforts to be inclusive and mandating that half of the delegates 
come from the South, important Southern leaders from al-Hiraak abstained from the NDC from the 
beginning, which  jeopardised  the  legitimacy  of  the  NDC’s  final agreement. Those who did join 
lacked the grassroots influence necessary to encourage buy-in for the outcomes of the NDC 
(Kestement, 2017; Gaston, 2014). Second, the process suffered from inefficiency and at times 
inadequate technical expertise (Kestement, 2017). Third, the all-inclusive nature of the NDC made 
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it challenging at times to engage in political negotiation. For example, some key political actors 
resisted entering into discussions with the presence of significant numbers of women and other 
civil society actors. As such, it is unclear whether the NDC framework was the right mechanisms 
for working through political deadlock (Gaston, 2014). At the same time, subsequent moves to 
begin working through issues outside the NDC were also controversial. The movement of decision-
making to the Regional Committee, considered small and unrepresentative, and to other smaller 
committees and political groups handpicked by the president and dominated by major parties, 
undermined the value and perception of the NDC’s inclusivity (Kestement, 2017; Gaston, 2014).  
Despite these challenges and the move toward more exclusive decision-making, the efforts of the 
NDC to engage in inclusive representation and decision-making is still significant as it has set a 
precedent for the engagement of new and different actors in Yemeni political processes 
(Kestement, 2017; Gaston, 2014; Papagianni, 2014). 
Lebanon: The Lebanese national dialogue was undermined by perceptions that it was an elite-
driven process that preserved the system’s status quo, instead of enabling genuine fundamental 
change. Whereas, national dialogues in other parts of the region have adopted quotas for the 
participation of women and civil society representatives, participation in Lebanon is based mainly 
on political and confessional inclusivity. This has resulted in widespread criticisms by civil society 
groups (Wählisch, 2017). 
Libya: The National Dialogue Preparatory Commission (NDPC), created in August 2013, included 
representatives of all political factions and communities in Libya. It conducted several tours 
throughout the country in an effort to facilitate some sort of dialogue with local actors. Its leaders 
were well known and had much credibility. This engagement with a broad range of societal actors 
is considered to be one of the key successes of the Libyan national dialogue (Van Lier, 2017; 
Fetouri, 2015). Nonetheless, there were still limitations. The failure to include militias and heads of 
municipalities is considered to have undermined the national dialogue (Blunck et al., 2017). It is 
thus considered important to include real power-holders from informal and traditional sectors, 
alongside various civil society actors and marginalised groups (Blunck et al., 2017). The National 
Conference was undermined, however, by the absence of a clear inclusion strategy or guidelines 
on how to engage in the selection process. This could be due in part to the short planning period 
and limited role allotted to the NDPC (Van Lier, 2017). 
The deterioration in the security situation, and the absence of inadequate readiness for dialogue 
and compromise among key political actors, also severely undermined the chances of success. 
The NDPC ceased its activities without being able to transform the public input from consultations 
into a meaningful and productive dialogue and for the government to be able to follow up on and 
enact its recommendations (Van Lier, 2017; Fetouri, 2015).  
South Sudan: The 2017 National Dialogue initiative in South Sudan has been successful thus far 
in addressing issues of inclusivity.  The aim of the dialogue is not only to end the violence but also 
to promote a culture of peaceful engagement through (Deng, 2017). In response to various 
criticism, the President has repeatedly revised the composition of the National Dialogue Steering 
Committee to ensure inclusivity, credibility and transparency (Deng, 2017). The Committee has 
also reached out to leaders of the opposition abroad, with the aim of allowing the process to include 
as many parties to the conflict as possible. Sub-committees of the national dialogue are also 
engaging in outreach consultations at the regional and grassroots level, in order to gather input to 
develop the agenda (Deng, 2017). 
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Mali: In Mali, National Conference proceedings were biased in favour of strong representation of 
the anti-government movements and political associations, to the exclusion of former dignitaries 
of the single party. Some Malians disapproved of this (Sy et al., 2016). In addition, Malians living 
outside of urban settings were also excluded to the extent that the process was initiated and 
directed by the capital Bamako. City-dwellers thus comprised the main representatives and the 
conclusions are generally preoccupied with urban concerns (Sy et al., 2016). 
Colombia: The preparatory commission for Colombia’s National Constituent Assembly (ANC), set 
up in 1990, held public hearings in all regions of the country in order to collect comments, requests 
and suggestions and to engage a wide cross-section of the population in discussion about the 
agenda. These consultations were relied upon as a basis for discussion in the ANC (Blunck et al., 
2017). Despite high participation rates and representation of the whole political and social 
spectrum of Colombian society, some analysts highlight the relative domination of intellectual elites 
and the marginalisation of ordinary people from the debate (Blunck et al., 2017). 
Trade-offs? Inclusion, efficiency and implementation 
The greater the inclusivity, the higher the chance of strong support from all stakeholders. However, 
bringing too many parties and  interests  to  the  negotiation  table  makes  it  harder  to  reach  an  
agreement (Blunck et al., 2017; Harlander, 2016). It can be difficult to balance inclusion, 
efficiency and the implementation of national dialogue outcomes. Large dialogues, with a 
substantial number of actors in the thousands, tend to have few decision-making powers; whereas, 
smaller dialogues of 100 to 200 people can allow for in-depth discussion (Papagianni, 2014).  In 
Yemen, for example, the highly inclusive national dialogue produced 1,800 recommendations on 
a wide range of topics. The dialogue ultimately did not succeed, however, in working through the 
key political roadblocks facing the country. It has been suggested that the all-inclusive and public 
nature of the conference undermined the ability to resolve key political questions, which may have 
been better resolved through smaller groups with specific political actors (Hartmann, 2017; Gaston 
2014).  Nonetheless, the inclusive dialogue was necessary to initiate a shift in the country’s 
governance and to create a norm of citizens’ participation in the decision-making process on 
national issues (Kestement, 2018). 
Experience with national dialogues also demonstrates that the more participatory and inclusive 
processes are, the more they tend to threaten the established power structures. Old elites may in 
turn have a vested interest in undermining implementation (Planta et al., 2015). The complexity in 
design, management and conduct of national dialogues with an extensive number of participants 
and agenda topics can also require the use of a large amount of material and technical resources. 
There may subsequently be inadequate resources left to facilitate implementation (Planta et al. 
2015). 
Less inclusive, smaller sized dialogues, while potentially easier to manage and implement 
may, however, differ little from elite-dominated negotiations (Papagianni, 2014). This could 
undermine perceptions of legitimacy and the transformative potential of national dialogues.  In the 
case of Sudan, the consistent failure of past negotiations is attributed in part to the narrow 
involvement of the government and armed rebels. While an inclusive process will likely make the 
process slower and more complex, involving the “silent majority” (including victims of conflict such 
as refugees and internally displaced persons) could make any agreement and outcomes more 
durable (El-Battahani, 2014).  
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It is typically not possible for everyone to be at the centre of the dialogue. The success of national 
dialogues can depend in large part on finding the right equilibrium between efficiency and 
inclusiveness; consensus-building, short-term deadlock breaking mechanisms and long-term 
transformational aims (Kestement, 2018). It may be advisable to focus on an “inclusive enough” 
composition, which includes stakeholders necessary for legitimacy and future implementation 
(Kaplan and Freeman, 2015).  Further, rather than treating inclusivity as a burden that is too 
unwieldly to manage, it would be helpful to focus on ways to reduce the complexity of the 
national dialogue through, for example, the creation of thematic working groups (Planta et 
al., 2015). The establishment of parallel working groups linked to the main negotiation table, 
matching participation with the thematic focus at stake, is one of the most common methods of 
broadening participation during times of transition (Blunck et al., 2017). 
Representation and selection criteria 
The process for the selection of delegates is one of the most important steps in organising a 
national dialogue (Harlander, 2016). Experience shows that the established selection criteria 
and procedures for participants in national dialogues can support or hinder the broad 
representation of different social and political groups and thus, the inclusivity and legitimacy of a 
national dialogue process (Blunck et al., 2017; Paffenholz et al., 2017; Harlander, 2016). In Tunisia, 
for example, the Quartet (a group of four civil society organisations) brought with it historically 
established societal ties and broad-based accepetance that benefitted the process at large 
(Paffenholz et al., 2017). 
Developing a selection method is challenging and political, involving the definition of 
constituencies, selection criteria and selection processes (Blunck et al., 2017). The selection of 
participants can take many forms: direct appointment by the president or the preparatory body; 
selection from within defined constituencies; or invitation with observer status (Blunck et al., 2017).  
In some cases, selection procedures have been co-opted by elites, who selected the participants 
most loyal to them to (Paffenholz et al., 2017).  In Yemen, the introduction of a quota system and 
socio-demographic selection criteria allowed for fairer representation, alleviating a previous 
selection system that was perceived to be unfair (Blunck et al., 2017) [See the section on inclusion 
and participation]. However, the polarised environment in which many people have multiple 
identities intersecting with conflict dynamics can make it inherently difficult endeavour (Paffenholz 
et al., 2017). 
Transparency in the selection criteria is significantly important, such that the public can 
understand how and why people got selected and to see a fair chance in getting their candidates 
elected.  In Jordan, the hand-picking of candidates gave the impression that the process is biased 
from the start. In Yemen, the allocation of the seats was contested and required transparent 
communication and clearly elaborated mechanisms (Blunck et al., 2017). 
Objectives and scope: mandate and agenda 
Mandate 
The mandate of a national dialogue defines its prerogatives and overall objectives (Harlander, 
2016). Each potential party to a national dialogue has a strong interest in influencing the drafting 
of the mandate as it will determine what can be discussed and decided upon during the dialogue. 
Consultations are essential to assess the expectations of the main stakeholders (Harlander, 
2016). 
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Mandates of national dialogues have been extremely diverse, including forming a new social 
contract, establishing transitional authorities, addressing past injustices and crimes, drafting a new 
constitution or addressing specific regional or thematic issues (Harlander, 2016). In Yemen, the 
NDC mandate was broad, to produce a new social contract, reflecting a range of expectations and 
irreconcilable objectives among various groups (Blunck et al., 2017).  In contrast, Kenya’s  National  
Dialogue  and  Reconciliation  process  was  more  limited  in  aim and scope, addressing 
specifically the issue of electoral violence and deep cleavages between the main parties (Blunck 
et al., 2017).  
It can be challenging to strike a balance between the breadth of the mandate, efficiency and 
independence. It is important to avoid overburdening the process (Blunck et al., 2017). While 
broad mandates can be successfully narrowed by participants during the actual process, such 
mandates risk triggering lengthy debates to redefine the exact terms of the mandate and disputes 
over the goal of the dialogue (Van Lier, 2017; Harlander, 2016). In Libya, the Prime Minister gave 
the NDPC a very broad mandate, in order to guarantee the NDPC’s independence by reducing the 
government’s influence in the process. This caused critical delays, however, as the NDPC had to 
spend several months developing a plan for the dialogue process. In addition, the dialogue’s 
ultimate goal and its role in the country’s transition remained vague, leading to confusion among 
international donors and the local population. This is turn further limited the NDPC’s impact (Van 
Lier, 2017). A narrower, more manageable mandate can be an efficient way to avoid these 
problems (Papagianni, 2014). It may be that the success of the Tunisian national dialogue was the 
limitation of its mandate to the key issues that had led to a political deadlock constraining the 
transition (Van Lier, 2017). However, a narrow mandate might greatly limit the room for change 
and may contribute to the persistence of an elite-led process (Harlander, 2016). 
While there is no one-size-fits-all mandate, a review of past national dialogues finds that clarity 
and relevance to local populations are key characteristics to adopt in deriving a suitable 
mandate (Blunck et al., 2017; Harlander, 2016; Papagianni, 2014). The mandate should clearly 
state the purpose of the process, as this will influence the process design and people’s 
expectations (Blunck et al., 2017). It is typically easier to mobilise the public and civil society around 
a dialogue process which has a clear, understandable, mandate and is expected to reach concrete 
outputs; whereas, unclear mandates can cause confusion during a dialogue, resulting in a loss of 
focus and to delays a participants dispute the goal itself (Papagianni, 2014). The mandate should 
also reflect the main concerns of the stakeholders and not be imposed by outsiders to the process 
and/or an external actor. It could, however, be supported by UN Security Council Resolutions, as 
was the case in Yemen (Blunck et al., 2017). The public will be more prone to invest their time in 




Similar to setting a mandate for the national dialogue, a key consideration for agenda-
setting is to avoid overburdening agendas. While it often the case that during times of transition, 
a  whole  range  of  topics pertaining  to  state  reform  seem  important, tabling  all  items  for  
discussion would  raise  expectations  that  cannot  be  met  by  a  time-bound national dialogue. 
Rather agenda items should be feasible and doable in the limited time frame (Blunck et al., 
2017). This can allow for greater focus, follow-through and success within the national dialogue 
(Gaston, 2014). Experiences with the national dialogue in Yemen indicate that the agenda should 
be streamlined to the extent possible, weighing carefully which political issues do or do not lend 
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themselves to a large-scale public forum, and ensuring the right balance between national dialogue 
and other transitional processes (Gaston, 2014). Condensing the number of issues that the NDC 
addressed to those more suited for that particular forum may not have prevented it from getting 
stuck in political roadblocks, but may have freed more time and resources to generate buy-in 
(Gaston, 2014). 
It can also be useful to sequence agenda items such that the process begins with “soft 
topics”. This can allow for participants to see that there are commonalities and can help to build 
confidence and trust, forming a foundation for further success (Blunck et al., 2017). At the same 
time, it is essential that “hot topics” are not ignored and that they are given sufficient space 
and time to be discussed in detail and to develop a roadmap on how to address those issues. In 
some national dialogues, the process was rushed through without adequate time to discuss and 
agree on the contested items (Blunck et al., 2017). Agenda items also need to reflect the 
concerns of the general public. A study of the 1991 national conference in Mali finds that the 
agenda items were at times very far removed from the priorities of the actors at the grassroots 
level.  Despite the wide range of subjects tackled in the dialogue, many actors still felt that some 
questions relating to their various priorities were not sufficiently taken into account (Sy et al., 2016). 
Peace dividends 
The transformative potential of national dialogue processes can only be realised if they result in 
agreements which promote outcomes that make a significant difference in the lives of different 
segments of society (Barnes, 2017). If national dialogue processes adopt a limited definition of 
peace, such as in the case of Sudan (where the focus was perceived to be on the welfare of South 
Sudan rather than all of Sudan), it can preclude the realisation of sustainable peace and 
democratic transformation (El-Battahani, 2014).  It is now widely recognised that there is a need 
for a comprehensive approach that addresses Sudan’s multiple conflicts and governance crises in 
concert, rather than piece by piece (El-Battahani, 2014). In Yemen, the population became 
frustrated with the national dialogue process, believing that it was overlooking issues important to 
the regular citizens (Kestement, 2018). While the NDC process adopted decision-making by 
consensus, which meant that decisions enjoyed broad support, there was no focus on the common 
issues in the future and on a long-term vision for the country (Elayah et al., 2018).   
How the transition is perceived depends to a large extent on tangible signs of progress at the local 
level. Quick impacts and visible peace dividends are thus important to the success of 
national dialogues (Hartmann, 2017).  The inclusion of development issues in national dialogues 
can open up opportunities to discuss long-term perspectives and peace dividends, which can 
enhance the legitimacy of national dialogues for the wider population.  The quality of development 
outcomes that are associated with national dialogues can produce the eventual tipping points for 
the success or failure of such processes. In Yemen, for example, the transitional government 
decided in 2014 to lift existing fuel subsidies, in an effort to reduce the budget deficit. This decision 
had an adverse effect on socio-economic conditions and contributed to mobilisation against the 
transitional government, to violence – and to the eventual collapse of the agreements reached at 
the NDC (Hartmann, 2017).  
Development issues and outcomes should thus be considered early in national dialogue 
processes (Hartmann, 2017). Given the time pressures of such processes, however, inclusion of 
development issues is often compromised by pragmatic considerations (Hartmann, 2017). In 
addition, discussion about socio-economic issues in national dialogues can be sensitive because 
they touch upon strategic interests of participant groups (Hartmann, 2017). In Lebanon, critics of 
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the national dialogue process noted that the national dialogue was selective in the issues it 
addressed (Wählisch, 2017). It is important to distinguish between real genuine dialogues that 
address key issues and root causes of conflict and superficial solutions that avoid them (Saeid, 
2016). 
Institutional framework and support structures 
Once the objectives of the national dialogue have been agreed upon, they need to be translated 
into corresponding institutions and procedures (Blunck et al., 2017).  Each national dialogue will 
have its unique structure corresponding to the context-specific needs and aim of each process. 
There are, however, some similarities (Blunck et al., 2017). The structure tends to respond to a 
key set of functions: preparing the process, overseeing the process, providing technical support 
and research, facilitating broad-based/representative decision-making and generating thematic 
input, often organised around working groups and subcommittees (Blunck et al., 2017; Paffenholz 
et al., 2017).  
A comprehensive support structure of important actors close to competing parties can help 
participants to compromise and to build coalitions, allowing them time to agree on common 
positions (Paffenholz et al., 2017; Kaplan and Freeman, 2015). Deadlock-breaking mechanisms 
can be built into the overall support structure (Blunck et al., 2017; Paffenholz et al., 2017). In 
Lebanon for example, the Common Space Initiative, established in 2010, served as a support 
structure and safety-net for the national dialogue. In addition to providing general support and 
expertise, it facilitated structured informal dialogues and collaboration among wide segments of 
society (including policy makers, intellectuals, experts, civil society actors), in order to break 
deadlock and create an environment conducive to progress. The Initiative gained much support 
from key officials across party lines (Wählisch, 2017). Coalition building among included actors 
can be a powerful strategy for actors to make their voices heard in national dialogues, by allowing 
them to come together to negotiate as a unified cluster out of concern for a specific issue or 
strategic interest. This occurred, for example, among women of different delegations or between 
non-armed and armed groups (Paffenholz et al., 2017). 
A review of 17 national dialogues finds, however, that support structures for involved actors 
were not directly an enabling or constraining factor in the ability to reach and implement 
agreements (Paffenholz et al., 2017). Others find that the absence of formal support structures 
has been a contributing factor to the breakdown of dialogues in the Middle East, for example, 
including in Yemen (Kaplan and Freeman, 2015).  
Nonetheless, an analysis of the structures finds that particular aspects and features of a support 
structure can influence negotiations (Paffenholz et al., 2017).  The preparedness of the actors 
through workshops and consultations, for example, can facilitate sustainable outcomes, by 
providing the necessary expertise and tools to make a genuine contribution (Paffenholz et 
al., 2017). Development actors can provide external expertise to enhance evidence-based policy-
making in the context of national dialogues. This can enable participants to the dialogue to make 
informed choices and to foster realistic expectations among the wider population about 
development prospects and peace dividends. In Yemen and Libya, for example, the World Bank 
and regional development banks provided stakeholders with relevant economic data (e.g. public 
expenditure reviews, poverty data etc.) to make informed policy choices (Hartmann, 2017). 
In Somalia, UNIFEM funded a women’s resource centre for information and dialogue, where 
women had access to advocacy materials and information on quotas and political processes. Such 
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support from UNIFEM and other NGOs enabled women’s organisations to select five of their 
members to represent the women’s agenda in the national dialogue. They were successful in 
establishing a 12 percent quota of women in the Transitional Federal Parliament and in inserting 
gender-sensitive language into the agreement (Paffenholz et al., 2017).  While support structures 
from external actors can enable the influence of participants, this does not, however, necessarily 
lead to the signing of an agreement or its implementation. The agreement in Somalia stemming 
from the national dialogue was ultimately never implemented (Paffenholz et al., 2017).  Support 
structures also do not necessarily improve the quality of participation. Again in Somalia, 
while international experts were present to advise members of technical committees, this expertise 
did not increase the influence of civil society representatives as negotiations remained heavily 
dominated by faction leaders (Paffenholz et al., 2017). 
Authority figures 
National dialogues are generally convened under the authority of a central figure or body (Blunck 
et al., 2017). Choosing a credible and broadly accepted convener can significantly affect the 
strength of the national dialogue. A convenor, mediator or facilitator should be independent, 
with significant leeway to act in accordance to what they consider best for the process, and thus 
not perceived as merely a puppet of the president or party in power (Blunck et al., 2017). They 
should also have the personal qualities of a charismatic, respected and credible leader who 
can capture people’s minds and aspirations. Convenors, mediators and facilitators with political 
clout and a high degree of political legitimacy can indicate seriousness and increase trust in 
the process and its eventual outcome (Blunck et al., 2017; Paffenholz et al., 2017). 
A skilled facilitator that all parties accept and feel comfortable with is often essential to developing 
trust and ensuring the process produces the maximum amount of give and take (Kaplan and 
Freeman, 2015). Their capacity can thus significantly shape the process of national dialogues, 
particularly with respect to how they deal with elites.  Facilitators have in the past persuaded elites 
to keep negotiating in moments of deadlock (Paffenholz et al., 2017). 
Decision-making procedures 
Decision-making procedures can enable or constrain the ability of national dialogues to reach 
an agreement and implement it (Paffenholz et al., 2017).  Decision-making rules, if carelessly 
drafted, could result in locking a dialogue in lengthy debates, or in vetoes or boycotts due to the 
frustration of some participants (Harlander, 2016). Similarly to the selection of participants, 
decision-making rules should be made transparent (Blunck et al., 2017). 
Decisions can be taken by a plenary, a decision-making body, or within the working groups. Final 
decisions in national dialogues are usually taken by consensus (or by simple majority) in the 
plenary, however, elites may take decisions outside the plenary, consequently excluding other 
participants (Blunck et al., 2017; Paffenholz et al., 2017).  In Somaliland, decisions were taken in 
the plenary, where the chairs of the proceedings were chosen on a daily rotating basis. This was 
considered to be an effective mechanism. However, other national dialogues with a similar 
decision-making procedure did not produce inclusive decision-making systems. In Nepal, for 
example, senior political leaders used the disagreement in the plenary to justify dominating the 
decision-making in meetings, often kept secret even from fellow party members. The Somali 
National Dialogue included a large number of delegates, however a decision-making body 
comprised of a small group of elites dominated the decision-making process. Civil society groups 
were not consulted on whether the Somali state should be a federal or centralised entity and were 
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often sidelined in discussions over power-sharing and representation. In Yemen, on the other 
hand, the decision-making procedure (a mix of plenary and working groups, each with its own 
rules) enabled effective decision-making, largely by consensus (90 per cent) (Paffenholz et al., 
2017). 
Elite decision-making is advocated in some cases. In the case of hard negotiations during key 
political moments, crucial decisions may be taken behind closed doors, often through majority 
voting or elite consensus (Blunck et al., 2017). This can be seen as facilitating substantial headway 
or as undermining the legitimacy of the process as elitist and exclusive (Blunck et al., 2017). While 
consensus can help to develop shared and expanded agendas beyond the key stakeholders 
and to include often excluded voices, consensus can also undermine national dialogue 
processes. In Lebanon, for example, the principle of consensus, the primary form of decision-
making in the country, has been a positive feature - ensuring that decisions of national concern 
are supported by the political leadership across party lines. However, the inability to reach 
consensus, in some cases, benefitted the more established forces, as the absence of 
movement meant preserving the status quo (Blunck et al, 2017; Wählisch, 2017). 
Consensus-based decision-making thus needs to be complemented by other pragmatic 
mechanisms where deadlocks can be broken (El-Battahani, 2014). Where participants cannot 
reach consensus and the national dialogue is deadlocked, sufficient or qualified consensus can 
serve as a deadlock-breaking mechanism. Sufficient consensus is reached if the main 
stakeholders on both sides of the conflict and/or with primary interests, agree with the decision, as 
was the case in South Africa (Blunck et al., 2017, 104; Hartmann, 2017). Qualified consensus 
means that it is enough for a decision to be adopted if a certain number of participants agree 
(Blunck et al, 2017, 104). In Yemen, if consensus in the NDC was not reached, the decision was 
passed to the Consensus Committee, which fulfilled a deadlock-breaking function by attempting to 
make adjustments to decisions and returning them to the working groups for another vote 
(requiring a 75 percent majority). If there was still no agreement, the decision would be passed to 
the President and a final decision made in consultation with other members of the NDC presidency. 
Such final decision making resulted, however, in some tensions and the discrediting of some 
decisions (Blunck et al., 2017). 
The use of working groups and subcommittees is a key mechanism for breaking deadlocks. 
While it is important for the most contentious issues to be discussed at the main table, it can be 
effective to break a contentious issue into manageable portions and task a working group to work 
out options for they could be managed or discussed at the main table (Blunck et al., 2017).  In the 
case of Yemen, the unwieldiness of the large NDC plenary resulted in a movement to smaller 
groups of certain key political actors for some issues. These actors should have traction within 
their parties or constituencies to be able to negotiate and enforce political compromises. There is 
a risk, however, of shifting the balance too far this way (Gaston, 2014). 
Confidence-building measures 
National dialogues must also be accompanied by a series of steps to attenuate tensions, 
such as confidence-building measures or providing relief to the civilian population through 
humanitarian or development programmes. It important to make some concessions or 
arrangements, which highlight the goodwill of the various factions. This is necessary in order to 
establish a level of “working trust”, enabling parties to engage in a meaningful dialogue 
(Elayah et al., 2018; Blunck et al., 2017; Harlander, 2016). The preparatory phase, in particular, 
tends to be characterized by low levels of trust, much tension, and a divisive atmosphere (Blunck 
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et al., 2017). When trust is already low, simply announcing a change is insufficient to convince 
parties that the changes are real.  If confidence-building measures are built into national dialogue 
processes, they can serve as unique opportunities for relationship- and trust-building, providing an 
indication of intentions in advance (Blunck et al., 2017).  
In Yemen, the selection of some opposition figures to join the Technical Preparatory Committee 
and the formation of a list of “20 points” of pressing grievances and concerns, pending the start of 
the dialogue, sent a powerful signal and fostered confidence in the process. While the President 
was sensitive to most of the points, and some steps were taken, there was however insufficient 
action on the points. This undermined the credibility of the process and failed to ensure more 
comprehensive participation by the Southern movement (Blunck et al., 2017; Murray, 2017; 
POMEPS, 2013). The general impression is that the NDC suffered from the absence of trust among 
the conflict parties, with various factions unable or unwilling to provide real guarantees that would 
in turn provide for an environment of trust-building prior to embarking on a dialogue. Ultimately, 
each party began working according to a private agenda that different form the public aims of the 
dialogue (Elayah et al., 2018). 
Trust-building is important throughout all phases of the national dialogue process, including the 
implementation phase – in order to ensure that actors trust the commitment of others to uphold the 
agreement forged between them (Hartmann, 2017). 
Implementation 
The success of national dialogues can be defined on two levels, first in terms of whether an 
agreement is reached; and second, the extent to which the agreement is implemented (Paffenholz 
et al., 2017). National dialogues thus do not end with the conclusion of the formal process, but 
continues with implementation (Kaplan and Freeman, 2015). In a review of 17 national dialogues, 
while most reached an agreement, only half of them were implemented (Paffenholz et al., 2017). 
The implementation phase requires careful planning and designing. It is important to adopt an 
inclusive and participatory approach in the implementation phase, similar to early phases of the 
dialogue (Blunck et al., 2017; Harlander, 2016).  In order to faciliate implementation, it is necessary 
to ensure that sufficient funds for implementation, expertise and accountability 
mechanisms are in place (Blunck et al., 2017). This phase is facilitated by various infrastructure 
and mechanisms. Transitional bodies and/or new institutions are often set up to implement 
the outcomes. It is important to consider guarantees and monitoring mechanisms, such as civil 
society monitoring arrangements, early on in the national dialogue process, such that key actors 
may feel bound by what has been agreed (Blunck et al, 2017; Harlander, 2016; Kaplan and 
Freeman, 2015). It can also be necessary to give the national dialogue an official status from the 
outset. In Yemen, for example, the Presidential Decree setting up the preparatory committee of 
the NDC specified that outcomes of the Dialogue were to be reflected in a constitution drafted after 
the dialogue (Murray, 2017).  
In Mali, the failure to create a monitoring and evaluation mechanism contributed to inadequate 
implementation of recommendations from the national dialogue. The government elected 
subsequent to the dialogue conference did not respect the recommendations (Blunck et al., 2017; 
Sy et al., 2016).  In Yemen, there was also no agreed upon mechanism for the implementation of 
outcomes (Elayah et al., 2018). In addition, Yemenis serving on the Constitution Drafting 
Committee did not have adequate expertise in federalism or familiarity with the technical nature of 
transitioning from a unitary to federal system, which undermined the implementation of national 
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dialogue outcomes (Williams et al., 2017).  Implementation of outcomes from the national 
dialogue can also be tough if participants have made unrealistic decisions, if the process is 
overburdened by provisions to implement and or/the provisions do not have sufficient underlying 
elite or social consensus. Political will to implement dialogue agreements is crucial for 
implementation (Murray, 2017). In Yemen, the agreements concerning federalism and a 30 percent 
quota for women in the legislature did not have sufficient support by influential elites, also 
contributing to their lack of implementation (Murray, 2017). 
External actors can either constrain or enable the implementation of an agreement, for 
example by providing financial and technical contributions to the implementation process 
(Hartmann, 2017; Paffenholz et al., 2017). The implementation phase tends, however, to be 
neglected by external actors (Paffenholz et al., 2017). 
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